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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ERNEST L. STALEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. No. 8190 
W. C. GRANT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To more accurately state the facts, as recited by the 
appellant in its brief, and to supplement the same, the re-




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On the evening of August 22, 1952, the plaintiff and 
respondent p.erein, Ernest L. Staley, left his place of employ-
ment in Salt Lake City, Utah, intending to proceed to his home 
in Murray, Utah. Staley was driving his 1949 Chevrolet Sedan 
and was traveling alone (Tr. 13 and 14). He proceeded south 
on State Street and stopped his automobile behind another 
vehicle, a Mercury, which was stopped on the North side of 
the intersection of 9th South Street and State Street waiting 
for the semaphore light to change from red to green (Tr. 
14, 20, 29, 30, 43 and 44). This Mercury, as well as plaintiff's 
automobile, was stopped in the left, inside lane, for south-
bound traffic. State Street, at this point, was 60 feet in width 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). Each street was divided by double 
traffic lines and each had two driving lanes provided for each 
direction of traffic, as well as a parking lane on each side 
of the respective streets (Tr. 4 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). 
On this particular evening, the streets were dry, the weather 
was clear, and visibility was good (Tr. 11). The intersection was 
well lighted and the semaphore traffic light at the intersection 
was apparently functioning in a normal manner (Tr. 11 and 
12). 
When the traffic light changed to green for south-bound 
traffic, the Mercury ahead of Staley proceeded forward and 
crossed the intersection, traveling south on State Street (Tr. 
15, 3 7, and 44) . Staley also proceeded forward on the green 
light and had traveled approximately two-thirds of the dis-
tance across 9th South Street when his automobile was struck 
on the left side by a 1951 Hudson Sedan owned and then 
being driven by W. C. Grant, the defendant and appellant 
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herein (Tr. 7, 8, 12, 16, 34, and 45). At the time of impact, 
Staley's vehicle was traveling in low gear and the impact was 
against the center of the left rear door on his automobile 
(Tr. 15 and 17). The force of the impact moved the rear 
of Staley's automobile some 10 feet to the south and west, 
as evidenced by the skid marks left on the surface of the 
roadway (Tr. 7, 8, 12, 16, and 25, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). 
There is a sharp conflict in the evidence concerning the 
manner in which this accident occurred. It is the contention 
of Staley, the respondent herein, that the intersection was 
clear of traffic when the light changed to green and he pro-
ceeded to follow the Mercury into and across the intersection. 
His position is supported by the testimony of the independent 
witnesses, Richard M. Hunsaker and Leon Lowell Davis, as 
well as by the physical evidence of the skid marks indicating 
the force with which his vehicle was struck. On the other 
hand, Grant, the defendant and appellant herein, contends 
that he was in the intersection and that Staley drove into 
the right front fender of his automobile (Tr. 50, 51, 53, and 
54) . The trial court resolved this conflict by adopting Staley's 
theory of the case and entered Findings of Fact and Judgment 
in accordance therewith, awarding the plaintiff the sum of 
$142.01, and costs. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
AWARDING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND EVIDENCE. 
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2. THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUlL TY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN AWARD-
ING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUlL TY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Inasmuch as the foregoing two points are inter-related, 
we shall consider them together in the argument hereinafter 
set forth. 
In order for the appellant to overcome the judgment 
entered herein against him, he must demonstrate to this Court 
that the evidence shows with such certainty that reasonable 
minds could not differ thereon that the plaintiff was guilty 
of negligence which proximately contributed to the collision. 
It is apparent from the appellant's brief that the only reason-
able deduction to be drawn from the evidence is that plaintiff 
was negligent, as a matter of law, in failing to observe the 
defendant's automobile until it was 4 or 5 feet away from 
him. This we cannot agree with. As we previously stated in 
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our brief, there is a sharp conflict in the evidence between 
plaintiff and defendant as to how the collision occurred. The 
plaintiff's version is supported by independent witnesses, as 
well as by the physical evidence of the force of the impact 
against the plaintiff's vehicle and the distance it was moved 
as evidenced by the 10 feet of skid marks made by the rear 
wheels in the direction it was pushed by defendant's vehicle. 
The defendant claims he was out in the intersection, stopped, 
and waiting for east-bound traffic to clear, before he attempted 
to turn south on State Street. He did not see the plaintiff's 
vehicle before the collision even though one-half of its length 
had to have passed in front of him prior to the impact. The 
defendant claims he was traveling right behind a taxi which 
had preceded his vehicle into the intersection and turned 
south on State Street. The plaintiff nor any of the other 
witnesses recall seeing any such taxi and testified that the 
intersection was clear except for the Mercury which preceded 
the plaintiff into the intersection on the green light for south-
bound traffic. The truth of the matter is, and the trial court 
so found, that the defendant apparently become confused 
at this intersection and drove his vehicle into it when the 
semaphore light was red for his direction of travel. This was 
the only reasonable deduction to be made in the light of all 
the testimony. As the record will show, this case has been 
tried twice, once in the City Court of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and again de novo in the Third Judicial District Court. The 
plaintiff having both times prevailed, and the trial court below 
having entered judgment in his favor, on conflicting matters 
the evidence must now be viewed in the light most favorable 
to him. Gibbs vs. Blue Cab (Utah), 249 P. 2d 213, affirmed 
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at 259 P. 2d 294; North vs. Cartwright (Utah), 229 P. 2d 
871; Staton vs. Western Macaroni Manufacturing Company, 
52 Utah 426, 174 P. 821. 
The appellant's brief gives great emphasis to the fact 
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
in failing to observe defendant's vehicle until just before 
impact or until it was 4 or 5 feet away. The cases cited by 
the appellant merely reiterate the well-established rule that 
a driver of a motor vehicle must at all times keep a reasonable 
lookout for others using the roadway upon which he is 
traveling. However, we fail to see wherein. these cases are 
applicable to the facts herein under consideration as they do 
not involve a collision occurring at an intersection controlled 
by a semaphore light. It must be remembered that the instant 
case was not tried before a jury and. so the learned trial judge 
was the trier both of the facts and the law and his judgment 
upon all questions of fact, if supported by any competent evi-
dence, will not be disturbed upon appeal. W eenig Brothers, 
Inc., vs. M. Nephi Manning, Utah 1953, 262 P. 2d 491. The 
physical facts of the skid marks and the point of impact 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) , positive! y established that plaintiff's 
automobile was about two-thirds through the intersection 
when forcefully struck by the front end of defendant's ve-
hicle. The impact on the street was 2 feet south and 1 foot 
west of the center of the intersection so it is perfectly reason-
able for the plaintiff to have followed the Mercury, which 
was stopped in front of him, into the intersection without 
seeing the defendant's vehicle until just before impact. The 
trial court made a finding (R. 79) that the plaintiff pro-
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ceeded into the intersection with the green light in his favor 
and. that at that time, the intersection was clear of any other 
traffic except for the Mercury ahead of him. The court fur-
ther found that as the front of the plaintiff's automobile 
reached about the center of 9th South Street, the defendant 
drove his said vehicle into the intersection from the east and 
collided with the left side of plaintiff's automobile (R. 79). 
With these findings supported by material and competent 
testimony, it can well be assumed that the trial court con-
cluded that the plaintiff found himself in a position of peril 
by the abrupt actions of the defendant and that he could do 
nothing to avoid the collision. Under the findings of the trial 
court, the plaintiff had the right of way and was entitled to 
rely upon such until he was put on notice by the actions of 
the disfavored driver (the defendant herein) that the right 
of way was not to be accorded to him. Under the trial court's 
interpretation of the evidence, the defendant's version of the 
accident was not accepted, and rightly so in the light of the 
plaintiff's testimony and that of the independent witnesses, 
particularly Richard M. Hunsaker, who was behind the plain-
tiff and saw the defendant enter the intersection in violation 
of the traffic light (Tr. 30, 31, 32, 33, '34, 38, 39 and 40). 
What was the duty of the plaintiff as he prepared to cross 
the intersection behind the Mercury? It was a duty to use 
reasonable care under all the circumstances. Plaintiff testified 
that he looked before starting forward and that the inter-
section was clear of traffic except for the Mercury ahead of 
him (Tr. 15, 16, 23, 27 and 28). The plaintiff was traveling 
slow and in low, or first gear. His duty was to look ahead, 
in the direction of his travel, and he was not obliged to watch 
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for traffic approaching from either the east or west until 
such time as he would have been put on notice as a reason-
able, prudent person, that someone would violate the law 
by traveling through the red semaphore light controlling east-
west bound traffic. The learned trial court having made find-
ings, and entered judgment in accordance therewith, thereby 
adopting plaintiff's theory of the case as supported by the 
weight of the evidence, we therefore respectfully conclude 
that the conflicting matters were resolved in favor of the 
plaintiff and should not be disturbed by this honorable Court 
on appeal. Such conclusion is supported by ample and sub-
stantial evidence in the record and is certainly reasonable in 
the light of all the testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that under the law, and the facts 
in this case, that the findings and judgment of the trial court 
are amply supported by the evidence and should be affirmed. 
:Respectfully submitted, 
F. ROBERT BAYLE 
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